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try to pick out this supposedly very small number of super-dangerous
rapists, the false positives are going to shoot up.752 That is where we get
the figures that people generally talk about: that out of three predictions
of violence, generally, one will be correct.753
Panel Discussion & Audience Questions
PATRICK REILLY:7 11 We are being joined by an additional panelist,
Daniel Feldman. He was the sponsor of the Megan's Law for New
York755 that we discussed earlier, and he will be answering questions.
Mr. Feldman has been an Assemblyman in New York since 1987, and
he is a frequent lecturer at a number of law schools.
We will start now with some of the questions on commitment7
56
752 See Francis, supra note 722, at 139-41.
751 See Herman, supra note 677, at 908 (citing the prevailing acceptance of this
accuracy ratio).
754Deputy Director of the Division of Mental Health and Advocacy of the New
Jersey Department of the Public Advocate; Adjunct Professor, New York Law School.
755 New York's "Sex Offender Registration Act" sets up a system of registration
for convicted sex offenders. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1996). Under the
statute, convicted sex offenders are required to register with local law enforcement agencies.
Id. at §168-f. Prior to release, a Board of Examiners will assess the risk of repeat offense
by the sex offender and recommend one of three levels of notification to the sentencing
court. Id. at § 168-1. The sentencing court will then make a judicial determination of the
level ofnotificationto be implemented. Id. at § 168-n. In addition, the Division of Criminal
Justice will maintain a directory of sexually violent predators which includes such
information as an offender's exact address, photograph, physical description and criminal
background. Id. at §168-q.
756 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.060 (West Supp. 1992). A sex
offender, if found to be a sexually violent predator, can be committed to the custody of the
department of social and health services for treatment until the offender's disorder has
changed in such a manner that he or she may be deemed safe to return to the community.
Id. MINN. ST. ANN. §609.1352 (West 1996). An individual can be committed to the
commissionerof correction for the statutory maximum punishment upon a finding that "the
crime was motivated by the offender's sexual impulses or was part of a predatory pattern of
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These questions have been put together by the students in the Civil Law
and Human Rights Clinic at New York Law School.
These statutes require both a prediction that the offender is
dangerous and that he or she poses a high risk of re-offending.757 How
accurate are predictions in this area? Do you have any more data on the
accuracy of the prediction of dangerousness for sex offenders?
ERIC JANUS: Yes. There exists a big controversy concerning
prediction accuracy,"' but there are several basic principles to
understand about prediction. First, it is well established that actuarial or
statistical means of prediction759 are more accurate, or at least better,
than clinical predictionsthat are based on impressionistic information
761
behavior .... [Tihe offender is a danger to public safety; and the court finds that the
offender needs long-term treatment or supervision beyond the presumptive term of
imprisonment ...." Id.
... See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168-1 (McKinney 1996).
758 See Morse, supra note 521, at 127 n.39 (noting that prediction accuracy rates
are often overstated and that older research models are criticized as being flawed).
... An actuarial or statistical prediction is a numerical prediction that a person with
certain characteristics will act a certain way "within a fixed period." See Christopher
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U.PA. L. REV. 97, 110-11 (1984).
Characteristicsused to establish actuarial predictions could include a person's age, sex, arrest
record, and marital status. Id. at 122.
760 Clinical predictions are performed by mental health experts who look for
characteristics of dangerousness in an individual during personal interviews. Slobogin,
supra note 759, at 109. The expert seeks information about the individualN background and
current mental health status, and may speak with the individual's family and friends to
determine the individual's current psychological state and past behavior. Id Clinical
methods of prediction are far more reliable due to the high false positive rates they generate.
Id. at 110-11. In addition, actuarial predictions have advantages over clinical predictions
because they include personal information which requires less guesswork to obtain. Id. at
122. Some researchers believe that clinical predictions are highly inaccurate because they
are "intuitive assessments"which need reinforcementby statisticalpredictions. Marc Miller
& Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 378-79
(1990). See also id. at 378. "The most accurate predictions - and the type that can be most
easily tested, verified, and challenged - are based on statistical or actuarial methods applied
to largely objective criteria such as age, criminal record, employment, and education." Id.
But see George E. Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal"
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The best actuarial work now is in the range of seventy-five percent
correct identification of people who will recidivate and those who will
not.76 1 However, you cannot stop there. You must understand what the
base rate of violence is in the population with respect to which you are
predicting 762 The lower the base rate, that is to say, the more infrequent
the phenomenon, then the higher the rate of error is going to be.
763 If
you are trying to select only the most dangerous people, then you are
going to have a relatively low base rate, and the possibility or the
probability of error is going to increase dramatically.
64
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you make a distinction between the
recidivists who have been voluntarily committed to treatment and those
who have not?
Defendant 66 VA. L. REv. 523, 530 (1980) ("whether actuarial predictions are likely to be
more accurate than clinical predictions is much debated").
761 See James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions
Under the Armed Career CriminalAct, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1951, 1962 (1991) (asserting, in
a discussion of the criminality construct models criminologistsuse to predict recidivism, that
"error rates in these models can be quite substantial; even the better models achieve only
seventy percent accuracy").
762 Base rates are established to determine probabilities that certain groups will
commit a crime. See Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive Detention and the
Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 415, 425 (1996); see also Slobogin, supra note 759, at 110, n.9. A base
rate for violent behavior within a particular population with certain characteristics can be
established by using actuarial data. Id.
763 See, e.g., Quinsey, et al., supra note 742, at 85. "Under low base rate
conditions,a predictionthat nobody will commit a violent act will lead to a higher accuracy
than a prediction that certain individuals will commit a violent act." Id.
7" See Fagan & Guggenheim, supra note 762, at 426 (suggesting that because
"[v]iolent criminality is a rare event" base rates would be low given the fact that there would
be fewer people to include in the base, and that low base rates lead to questionable prediction
accuracy).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
ERIC JANUS: There are some studies that do make that distinction.765
One of the best that I know of comes from Dr. Vernon Quinsey.766 He
reviewed all of the recidivism studies and did a weighted average to
derive recidivism figures as follows: approximately eighteen or nineteen
percent for non-familial child molesters; that is, non-incest, heterosexual
child molesters; homosexuals are higher; heterosexuals are lower at 18.6
percent; for rapists it was in the range of twenty-three or twenty-four
percent. 767 When you take those figures and combine them with the
seventy to seventy-five percent accuracy rate, and a recidivism rate of
eighteen percent, then approximately thirty-seven percent of your
predictions of violence are going to be correct.6
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You did not answer the question about
treatment. Many treatment programs around the country are not
voluntary.769 For instance, Megan's offender went to treatment, but did
not really participate in treatment. 70 There are people who really want
to change, but there others, as you say, who should be committed
765 See generally Vernon Quinsey, et. al., Assessing Treatment Efficacy in Outcome
Studies of Sex Offenders, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 512, 523 (1993) (discussing
numerous studies of recidivism rates).
766 Dr. Vernon Quinsey is the author and co-authorof dozens of books, articles and
studies regarding violent crime, criminal behavior, and recidivism. For a partial, but
comprehensive listing of his works, see id. at 103-05.
767 See generally Vernon L. Quinsey, et al., ASSESSING DANGEROUSNESS:





1 See generally Jessica Willen-Berg Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Silence:
Taking a Stand on Fifth Amendment Complications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 700 (1994) (arguing that therapeutic sentencing alternatives are often
given as a condition for probation, and that the cooperation of the patient is a prerequisite
to successful treatment).
77
1 See Montana, supra note 180, at 570. Jesse Timmendequas, the man accused
of the attack against Megan Kanka, received a ten-year sentence to the Adult Diagnostic and
Treatment Center, also known as Avenel, of which he only served six years. Id.
128 [Vol. XIII
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forever.1'
ERIC JANUS: I know that there are some studies that have shown
recidivism rates for individuals coming out of treatment programs that
are as low as ten or fifteen percent, and correspondingly higher for
people who are untreated, yes.772
ALEXANDERBROOKS: With respectto the issue of dangerousness. 73
in an article I wrote, I devised a hypothetical assuming that the accuracy
rate of dangerousness predictions is only fifty percent (but, obviously,
the accuracy rate is much higher than that).7 If you have two sex
offenders with similar profiles, one is likely to re-offend, and the other,
however dangerous he may have been in the past, is not likely to re-
offend. You then have, in effect, two choices: either you confine them
both or you let them both go. If you let them both go, you know that
there will be one person who will commit at least one, maybe many,
serious sexual offenses which will harm women and children. On the
other hand, if you confine them both, then you are confining at least one
innocent person, innocent being defined as not likely to re-offend in the
future, but a person who has already had a record of criminal offenses.
This brings us to a value question: which group are you more
771 See Boerner, supra note 556, at 529 (citing several newspaper editorials which
opine that some types of criminals, like sex offenders, need to be permanently removed from
society).
772 See generally Robert E. Freeman-Longo and Ronald V. Wall, Changing a
Lifetime of Sexual Crime.: Can Sexual Offenders Ever Alter Their Ways? Special Treatment
Programs Provide Some Hope, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar. 1986, at 58 (discussing
recidivism rates among sex offenders).
773 See Brooks, supra note 568, at 710 (defining dangerous individuals as those
"who have been convicted of violent sexual crimes, and who at the time of their pending
release from prison or other discharge, suffer from a mental condition that causes them to
be likely to continue to engage in acts of sexual violence").
."4 See id. at 752 (stating that recent data shows that predictions of "future violent
sexual crimes" are accurate at least 50 percent of the time, and greater than 50 percent in
cases involving repeat offenders).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
interested in protecting, the women and children on one hand, or the sex
offenders on the other?
775
It would be great if we lived in a world in which we never made any
mistakes at all, but we do make quite a number of mistakes, and those
mistakes are both constitutionally and morally acceptable because we
have no alternative.7
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think we do have an alternative that we keep
forgetting about: prevention. The system ignores the fact that most sex
offenders were offended themselves.777 To prevent this cycle we must
apply funds to help the victims of sex crimes early on.
ALEXANDER BROOKS: I agree with you entirely, but what I am
suggesting is that, given the present situation, when you are confronted
with two sex offenders you have no alternative.778
Now, if what you are saying is that we ought to do other things
as well, not only do I agree with you, but if I have an opportunity later,
I will explicate further. For now, one of the things that we do not
adequately explore is treatment.779 By treatment we are not talking
771 See generally, Sex-OffenderRegistrationLaws Pit Victims 'Rights Against Civil
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at L5 (discussing the impetus for, and ramifications of,
sex-offender registration laws).
11See Brooks, supra note 568, at 753-54 (explainingthat mistakes are inevitable,
and distinguishingbetween prediction errors as they pertain to decisions to release offenders,
from such errors as they relate to confining individuals). But see In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring) (stating that "it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free").
777 See Elizabeth P. Bruns, Cruel And Unusual?: Virginia's New Sex Offender
RegistrationStatute, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 171, 172 (1995) (reporting that ninety
percent of all sex offenders were once victims of child sexual assault).
7 See, e.g., Bedarf, supra note 190, at 910 (discussing how "[clommunity
notification laws fail to discriminatebetween those capable of rehabilitationand those whose
deviancy is permanent.").
"I Id. at 898 (stating that community notification laws "explicitly reject the idea
that the state can rehabilitate sex offenders" by focusing on protection instead of
rehabilitation).
130 [Vol. XIII
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about curing sex offenders,78 but giving them the means to control their
behavior and following up in the community. 8 I agree with you one
hundred percent on that.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just want to say, Professor Brooks, for your
future writing about the subject, you keep mentioning 'women' and
'children.' You might want to look at men as being offended against, as
well. It is dramatically under reported because they are homosexual.8 2
ALEXANDER BROOKS: Yes, I am aware of that. I was attempting to
simplify the presentation. Everybody in the field agrees that ninety-five
percent of the victims are women and children, if not ninety-eight
percent.783
AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, they do not agree.8  It is under
780 Julia A. Houston, Sex Offender RegistrationActs: An Added Dimension To The
War On Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 731 (1994). "'1 don't think you can cure rapists...many
come out worse than the way in which they went in."' Dr. Fred Berlin, Director of the
Sexual Disorders Clinic at Johns Hopkins University, ABC News Forum: Men, Sex & Rape,
(ABC television broadcast, May 5, 1992).
"' See, e.g., Montana, supra note 180, at 598-99 (stating that treatment programs
only teach offenders to control their behaviors, and that offenders should continue to receive
treatment once they return to the community).
72 See, e.g., Liz Kowalcyzk, Boys Victims More Than Thought, PATRIOT LEDGER
(Massachusetts), May 18, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 8053902 (quoting the director
of a Boston rape counseling program as saying "'[b]oys fear being labeled a homosexual, so
[rape has] been terribly under reported'"); see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087,
1089 n. 1 (1986). "The apparent invisibilityofthe problem of male rape, at least outside the
prison context, may well reflect the intensity of the stigma attached to the crime and the
homophobic reactions against its gay victims." Id.
783 See CRAIG PERKINS & PATSY KLAUS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION 1994, at 4 (Apr. 1996) (reporting that ninety-fourpercent of victims of rape,
attempted rape and sexual assaults in 1994 were female).
784 Compare id. with LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD
VICTIMIZERS VIOLENT OFFENDERSAND THEIR VICTIMS 2 (Mar. 1996) (noting that "three in
four child victims of violence were female") and Kowalcyzk, supra note 782, at I (reporting
that eighty percent of sex abuse victims at a Boston program are women, and twenty percent
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
reported.785
ALEXANDER BROOKS: Yes, there have been reports about men as
victims, and women as sex offenders.786
PATRICK REILLY: I believe that [the audience member] is talking
about men and women as offending against men or male children.
ALEXANDER BROOKS: Yes, in prison that is common.787
PATRICK REILLY: Is treatment for sex offenders, or particularly
violent sex offenders 88 ever effective? Is there any effective treatment
for these disorders?
ALEXANDER BROOKS: I would like to address that question. Some
time ago I firmly believed that treatment was not effective. There had
been some very important outcome studies which examined the results
are men).
7 . See Kowalcyzk, supra note 782, at I (reporting that Boston social workers
believe that the statistics for male rape are low because "boys are less likely to tell");
PERKINS & KLAUS, supra note 783, at I (noting that "almost two-thirds of victims of
completed rapes did not report the crime to the police").
786 A 1993 survey of rapes in New York reveals that out of 1,930 rape arrests, men
accounted for over 1,909, while only twenty-one women were arrested for the crime. See
DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, NEW YORK STATE, 1993 CRIME AND JUSTICE
ANNUAL REPORT, at 21 (1994).
787 See generally David M. Siegal, Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challengefor the
Eighth Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Setter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1542-43 (1992)
(discussing the high incidence of homosexual rape in prison and the spread of HIV
infection).
788 Both phrases are legal rather than medical terms. See, e.g., DSM-IV,supra note
606, at 527-28 (omitting any reference to violence in its definition of pedophilia). Various
sex offender statutes categorize the crime by the degree of violence involved. See, e.g., N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 168-1(5)(b)(ii)(McKinney 1996) (delineatingrisk factors used to assess the
potential societal danger posed by sex offenders).
132 [VOL. XIII
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of treatment and non-treatment of sex offenders.7 9 In those, it was
determined that either there was no difference 791 or that, ironically in
some cases, offenders who had been treated actually emerged from
treatment and offended at a higher rate than those who had not been
treated. T9
More recently, I have become increasingly persuaded that
treatment is critical. There are now entirely new treatment methods
being used in institutions.792 Many of the older treatment modalities
were completely ineffective.793 Some of them were even absurd, like
masturbation satiation,9 things of that order. There now is some
renewed hope for treatment, and there are some preliminary studies
which indicate that the new methods of treatment are more successful.
There are also methods of treatment that are not even in general
use which hold out a great deal of promise, such as the anti-androgenic




792 See, e.g., Robert J. McGrath, Sex. Offender Treatment: Does it Work?,
PERSPECTIVES at 24 (1995) (observing that new studies show significantly better results in
treating sex offenders).
79
1 See Gordon C. Nagamaya-Hall,Sexual Offender Revisited: A Meta-Analysis of
Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. (No. 5) (1995) (citing
Lita Furby, et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1989)(stating
that there is no conclusive evidence that treating offenders lowers their recidivism rates)).
794 But see Marty Klein, Sex, Crime & Punishment:Are We Willing to Rehabilitate
Sexually Dangerous People?, PLAYBOY, May, 1995, at 44. Masturbation satiation is a
reconditioning treatment used with sex offenders. Id. "After masturbating to climax,
offenders continue masturbating for two more hours to fantasies of inappropriate behavior."
Id. "The refractory period makes arousal difficult, and the repetitive fantasies gradually
become boring and even irritating." Id. The technique was pioneered by Dr. Gene Abel,
who reported success rates of more than eighty percent. Id. See also generally P. Johnston,
et. al., The Effects of Masturbatory Reconditioning With Nonfamilial Child Molesters 30
BEHAv. REs. THERAPY 559 (Sept 1992) (discussingthe nature and efficacy of masturbation
satiation).
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treatments.7 95 Depo-Provera, for instance, is a drug that suppresses
sexual drive.!" The idea behind the use of that drug is that, particularly
with pedophiles,who have enormous drives,797 if you use that sex-drive-
suppressing drug798 and combine it with other treatment modalities,799
you can help these offenders. This assumes, of course, that they are
motivated to control their urges. Particularly if you have follow up in
the community so that after these offenders receive that treatment and
are released, they are monitored, supervised, °° and helped with various
programs.80" You must constantly reinforce them.0 2 Nevertheless, if you
795 See generally Fred S. Berlin & Carl F. Meinecke, Treatment of Sex Offenders
with Anti-androgenicMedication: Conceptualimation, Review of Treatment Modalities, and
Preliminary Findings 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601 (1981) (explaining that anti-androgenic
treatment involves hormonal injections which, in preliminary studies, have shown to result
in a noticeable reduction in sexually deviant activity).
796 Linda S. Demsky, The Use ofDepo-Proverain the Treatment of Sex Offenders:
The Legal Issues, 5 J. OF LEGAL MED. 295, 296, 300 (1984) (stating that an individual's sex
drive is substantially decreased when subject to Depo-Provera injections).
" See, e.g., Alan Cairns, "Threat to All Children; "Expert Says Pedophilia Can't
Be Cured, TORONTO SUN, May 11, 1996, at 25. Dr. Robert Dickie, a psychiatrist at the
Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, affirms that "[a] pedophile's sexual desire for children runs
as deep as the heterosexual urge to procreate .... Id.
... See Demsky, supra note 796.
'9' See generally A. Kenneth Fuller, Child Molestation and Pedophilia: An
Overview for the Physicians, 261 JAMA 602, 608-09 (1989) (recommending that drug
treatment be used in conjunction with other treatment modalities such as psychotherapy and
behavior therapy).
800 See, e.g., Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Child Sexual Abuse: Its Causes.
Consequences, and Implicationsfor Probation Practice, 59 FED. PROBATION 69, 75 (1995)
(recommending that "probation departments.. implement specialized units to monitor sex
offenders in conjunction with the offender's therapist, employer, and family").
"o See, e.g., Freeman-Longo and Wall, supra note 772, at 59 (explaining the
rehabilitative significance of participation in an outpatient, aftercare counseling program).
802 See, e.g., id. (maintaining that sexually deviant behavior is usually "deeply
ingrained ... and most sex offenders need extensive psychological help" to alter their
behavior patterns).
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prevent a certain number of sex offenses by use of this treatment,0 3 even
though you can anticipate a certain amount of failures," 4 you are ahead
of the game. On the other hand, it costs a great deal of money.80 5 That
is something that states are very unwilling to expend.8"6
But it would take too long for me to discuss more general issues
here. I do want to say that I join with those who assert that there is a
certain segment of sex offenders who are motivated to change,80 7 who
are treatable,80 8 who, if given treatment, can prevent themselves from
engaging in sex offenses.80 9 That is better than sending them to prison
after they have done it.8"0 It is better than community notification.8"' It
.03 Id. at 64 (asserting that untreated sex offenders are eighty percent more likely
to re-offend, while those who complete treatment programs are estimated to manifest only
a ten and twenty-five percent likelihood to re-offend).
104 See McGrath, supra note 792, at 24, 26 ("[Treatment] does not work with all
sex offenders, and all treatments do not work equally well....").
80 See, e.g., Freeman-Longo & Wall, supra note 772, at 64 (stating that "the
expense of treatment ... may be greater than the cost of imprisonment without treatment.
..."). But see McGrath, supra note 792, at 25 (estimating a substantial cost savings to the
state of Vermont when sex offenders receive treatment and, thereby, do not re-offend).
806 See, e.g., Freeman-Longo& Wall, supra note 772 at 64 ("Many state-sponsored
treatment programs now exist tenuously, viewed with ambivalence by a public uncertain that
sex offenders'deserve' more than the punishment of prison, concerned about the expense of
treatment .....
807 Id. (asserting that "those who participate in voluntary treatment programs.
may be somewhat more motivated to change than the average sex offender").
808 See McGrath, supra note 792, at 24 (discussing a 1993 analysis of sex offender
recidivism which noted a recidivism rate of 10.9 percent for treated offenders, and 18.5
percent for untreated offenders). But see Lita Furby, et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A
Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 27 (1989) ("There is as yet no evidence that clinical
treatment reduces rates of sex re-offenses in general and no appropriate data for assessing
whether it may be differentially effective for different types of offenders.").
..9 See, e.g., Lurigio, supra note 800, at 73. "[T]reatment is designed to help [sex
offenders] cope better with feelings and events that put them at risk for subsequent sex
crimes." Id.
8 ' See Freeman-Longo& Wall, supra note 772, at 58. "[I]mprisonment, far from
being a deterrent, may have exacerbated [a sex offender's] problems." Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
is better than so many other things. A lot of effort has to be put into it,
but it will work with a significant group of sex offenders." 2
ROBERT FARLEY: If I may address that. One of the problems with
that outlook is that the failures in this type of crime-especially when
you are talking about pedophiles-are unacceptable when you consider
the degree of severity of the crime and the impact that it has on the
victim, an impact that can so deeply and severely scar that victim.813
Society has to take a look at whether that crime should be punished
effectively, not by commitment, but by a life imprisonment sentence." 4
That is the most effective deterrent, according to this Attorney General,
that you are going to have. Pedophiles have a recidivism rate which is
through the ceiling."s 5 I was just talking with a representative of the
Manhattan District Attorney's Office and the statistics that I have seen,
and the statistics that she deals with on a daily basis, are in the ninety
811 See, e.g., Michael L. Bell, Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Community
Notification Law: Will it Protect Communitiesfrom Repeat Sex Offenders?, 34 DuQ. L. REV.
635, 656 (1996). "[A] large number of released sex offenders subjected to community
notification laws report false addresses or never register with the proper authorities." Id.
812See, e.g., Freeman-Longo& Wall, supra note 772, at 64. "Most untreated sex
offenders released from prison go on to commit more offenses - indeed, as many as eighty
percent do. By contrast, the recidivism rate for sex offenders who have completed state-run
treatment programs is ... between ten and twenty-five percent." Id.
"3 See, e.g., Lurigio,supra note 800, at 70. "Immediatelyfollowing sexual abuse,
twenty percent to forty percent of molested children exhibit psychiatric problems...." Id.
814 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 389, at 562 (asserting that "New Jersey must
ensure that all violent child sex offenders are given extended sentences in view of the
devastating and lifelong consequences suffered by the victims of sex crimes..."). But see
Goodman, supra note 6, at 776 (explaining that psychiatrists have not yet determined that
sex offenders are criminals and deserve to be criminally punished, and that some
professionals believe that offenders are mentally ill and only require medical treatment).
815 See generally Tracy L. Silva, Dial '1-900-Pervert' and Other Statutory
Measures that Provide Public Notification of Sex Offenders, 48 SMU L. REV. 1961 (1995)
(surveying sex offender legislation throughout the country).
136 [Vol. XI1l
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percent range.8"6 It is unacceptable. You are going to have that scar on
these children for life. You should have a system which is set up to be
deal with the criminal justice system rather than the civil commitment
system.8 17 The latter entails a lower threshold.818 When a violent sexual
predatory offense is committed by a pedophile, we should consider, as
a society, whether the offender should receive a life imprisonment
term.8"9 It is a balancing test with society considering whether that
person is going to commit that crime again.82° Should we take that
chance? If he or she is duly convicted in a court of law, perhaps he or
she should, on that basis, never get out.
PATRICK REILLY: I think we had testimony earlier that being civilly
committed, which only requires clear and convincing evidence,
821
actually keeps offenders incarcerated longer in Minnesota than does
16 The reported recidivism rates vary. See, e.g., David Van Biema, A Cheap Shot
at Pedophilia: California Mandates Chemical Castrationfor Repeat Child Molesters, TIME,
Sept. 9, 1996, at 60 (stating that the recidivism rate may only be sixty-five percent); Thomas
J. Reed, Reading Goal Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex
Offender Cases, 21 AM. L. CIuM. L. 127, 154 (1993) (stating that the recidivism rate among
sex offenders is fifty percent).
817 See Morse, supra note 521, at 121-22 (discussing how criminal confinement
and civil commitment differ in purpose and effect).
88 Id. "Civil commitment does not require the same procedural protections as
criminal incarceration because the detention is not punishment ..... Id.
"9See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 389, at 522. "Research shows that the general
public overwhelmingly favors keeping sex offenders incarcerated." Id.
20 See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 398 (N.J. 1995). In response to the
defendant's motion to enjoin enforcement of New Jersey's sex offender registration and
notification statute, the Court stated: "[a]s the punitive impact becomes more pronounced
... the balance may shift and the fact of punishment may overwhelm the purity of the
government'saction, imputing to it, perhaps for doctrinal consistency, perhaps incorrectly,
a punitive purpose." Id
821 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Here, the Court held that in civil
commitment proceedings the'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of proof places too high
a burden on the state given diagnostic uncertainties. Id. at 432. The Court further held that
to satisfy due process requirements, the clear and convincing evidence standard is adequate.
Id. at 433.
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being criminally convicted, because no one got out in Minnesota.822
ROBERT FARLEY: The issue of commitment raises more
constitutional questions than do straight sentences. 23 But at least that
puts people on warning before they do anything. 24 If you predatorially
sexually attack a child, then you are going to go to jail for the rest of
your life. 25
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you distinguish between the different kinds
of pedophilia. For instance, whether it is predatory?
PATRICK REILLY: [The audience member] is asking about
distinguishing between the various kinds of pedophilia, such as
822 It has been argued that "a psychopathic personality condition is untreatable, and,
therefore, [civil] confinement is equivalent to life-long preventative detention." In re
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994).
823 See, e.g., id. The defendant, who challenged his commitment under the
Minnesota Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act (MINN. STAT. ANN. §526.09-.10
(West 1992)), raised substantiveand procedural due process claims based on the possibility
of indefinite commitment. Id. Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995). Call, who
was committed as mentally ill and dangerous, claimed that his continued civil commitment
constituted double jeopardy. Id.
824 See, e.g., Brian G. Bodine, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator
CommitmentSystem: An Unconstitutiond Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET
SOuND L. REv. 105, 139 (1990) (stating that "a potential sex offender will more likely be
deterred by the threat of a long prison sentence than by that of detention in a state mental
facility").
825 In California, punishment for sexual offenses ranges from life imprisonment
without parole for twenty-five years, to life imprisonment without parole for fifteen years.
Zamoyski, supra, note 535, at 1253-54. However, for both first-time and habitual sex
offenders, the opportunity for parole is prohibited until the offender has served eighty-five
percent of the minimum sentence. Id. In Minnesota, the sex offender can be put in prison
for a maximum of forty years, or can be confined indefinitely for psychiatric treatment if the
offender poses a danger to public safety. MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.1352 (West Supp. 1996).
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predatory and incestuous. 26
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Also, you did say that there are certain kinds
[of offenders] that might not be treatable, such as the ones which involve
fixations. 27
ROBERT FARLEY: The bill that we have submitted to the legislature
does not distinguish among those varieties. 28 It is the conduct of the
individual who commits that crime that is relevant: what he does, not
who he is. 29
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But as far as treatment is concerned, for some
people treatment works, 3° for others, it does not.8 3'
826 Pedophilia is legally defined as "a desire for, an attempt at, or actual
consummation of sexual relations with a prepubescent child and encompasses both
heterosexual and homosexual activity." Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The
Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1451, 1474 n.129
(1994). A predatory pedophile is one who consciously seeks out children for the purpose
of obtaining sexual gratification from them to quench his desires. See United States v.
Surratt, 867 F.Supp. 1317, 1324 (N.D. Ohio 1994). Incestuous pedophilia occurs when the
pedophilic offense is committed against someone of blood or step-relation to the offender.
See William F. Enos, et al., Forensic Evaluation of the Sexually Abused Child, 78
PEDIATRICS 385 (1986).
127 Fixated pedophiles have been "obsessed since early adolescence with the
fantasy and reality of sex with children [and they] are particularly difficult to treat
successfully." Freeman-Longo & Wail, supra note 772, at 58.
828 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168-a (McKinney 1996) (limiting pedophile
categories to degrees of violence).
829 The New York statute defines sex offenders in terms of convictions for, inter
alia, rape, sodomy, sexual abuse and incest. See N. Y. CORRECT. LAW §168-a.l - 2
(McKinney 1996).
830 See, e.g., Rhonda L. Rundle, Medicine: Will 'Chemical Castration' Really
Work?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1996, at BI. "Researchers at the John Hopkins clinic report
rates of repeat of between ten percent to fifteen percent in men who received [drug]
treatments combined with 'talk' therapy. Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
ROBERT FARLEY: It is a societal decision that we have to make. The
statistics right now demonstrate that treatment does not work, and the
recidivism rate is so high. Society, therefore, has to make a
determination whether that risk is worth taking. 32 When a person is
duly convicted in a court of law for being a sexual predator against a
child, for raping that child, that person should go to jail for the rest of his
or her life.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Earlier in the conference today, it was
mentioned that, with regard to Megan's Law in New York, there are
diffirent categories.
831 See, e.g., StephanieN. Mehta, Shrink Rap: TreatingSex Offenders Becomes an
Industry, But Does It Work?, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1996, at A I (concludingthat therapy has
not proven effective, and reporting a 1993 Canadian study which found that "42% of
imprisoned child molesters are later re-convicted for violent sexual crimes - whether they
received therapy or not").
832 Bedarf, supra note 190, at 893 (stating that " []egislatures, courts, and advocates
all agree that sex offender registration statutes are intended to address the high recidivism
rate of sex offenders").
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ROBERT FARLEY: Not everyone who has to register under Megan's
Law in New York is a pedophile.833
PATRICK REILLY: And we are not talking about everyone who is
committed as a sexual offender being a pedophile, either. 34
ROBERT FARLEY: That is correct.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It sounds like you take everybody in the same
scope. You do not want to acknowledge a difference?
ROBERT FARLEY: No. I think that what you have to look at is the
type of crime committed and recidivism rates for those people. If you
look at pedophilia, as Professor Brooks mentioned, it has a sky high rate
of recidivism, 35 and children are being scarred for the rest of their
lives.836 We have to look at the victims here, too. And with respect to
your question concerning the provision of services for victims,
prevention is the only way to go here. You have to get these victims
133 The New York statute requires that all sex offenders register, without regard to
the age of the victim. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a to f (McKinney 1996).
134 See N.Y. CORRECT LAW § 168-a.2 (McKinney 1996) (including rape, sodomy,
sexual abuse, incest, unlawful imprisonmentand kidnappingof individualswho are younger
than seventeen years old in the definition of sex offenses).
835 See, e.g., Christopher Ringwald, Task Force Proposed to Aid Sex Offenders
Law, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Aug. 20, 1996, at B8, available in 1996 WL 9554708.
("'[P]edophileshave the highest recidivism rate among criminals'...." (quoting Marc Carey
of the New York State Attorney General's Office)).
136 See, e.g., Mike Stanton, Bearing Witness: Professor's Story of Remembered
Abuse Strikes a Chord, PROVIDENCE SUNDAY, June 4, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL
9245765 (stating that "shame and other emotions stemming from having been molested leave
scars into adulthood, even among successful people").
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early and treat them early so they do not become pedophiles.837
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, to break the cycle. It is the only way. 3'
ERIC JANUS: I want to say one thing about treatment. There is one
meta-study that I have read by Hall.839 It looked at all of the treatment
outcome studies84° and found a small treatment effect.14' In other words,
he says that he does believe treatment can be effective,4 2 however he
says the effect is stronger with outpatient, voluntary patients, rather than
with inpatient.
8 43
AUDIENCE MEMBER: After-care, life-long after-care. A true
837 See, e.g., Morgan Man Sentenced to 220 Years for String of Sex CrimesAgainst
Children, COURIER(Louisville, KY), Feb. 12, 1989, at 4B, available in 1989 WL 3865663.
"All research tells us that victims child sexual abuse are likely to become abusers themselves.
* ." (quoting Morgan County, Kentucky prosecutor Jane S. Craney). Id.
838 See, e.g., Experts Say Child-to-Child Sexual Abuse Cases Increasing, SAN
ANTONIO LIGHT, June 3, 1991, at B3, available in 1991 WL 5012980. "If you have one
originator who abuses ten people, and those ten people abuse ten people, then we're up to
one hundred . . . " (quoting Jeanne Wilson, an investigator at the Texas Human Services
Department). Id.
839 Nagayama-Hall, supra note 793, at 802.
840 The twelve recent studies which were analyzed "compared the recidivism of
sexual offenders [of all varieties] who had completed a treatment program with sexual
offenders who had completed a comparison treatment program or did not receive treatment."
Id. Thirty-two other studies were rejected due to the small number of participantsexamined,
and forty-eight were rejected for having no control group or for not reporting recidivism
data. Id. at 803.
84 Id. at 806. The analysis reveals that, of similarly situated sexual offenders,
twenty-seven percent of those who were untreated and nineteen percent of those who were
treated offended again. Id.
842 See generally id.
843 Id. at 807. "Among studies of institutionalizedsamples, there was a small effect
size for treatment, whereas there was a medium effect size for treatment studies of outpatient
samples." Id.
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pedophile does not change the way he thinks.844 Even if you put him on
Depo-Provera,845 he is still thinking about molesting children.846 Often
the criminals, the inmates, I found too, if they cannot get an erection,
they use a Coke bottle or their fingers. It does not stop them from
committing these crimes. It is compulsive behavior, which you do not
cure.847 You can only do behavior modification. 48
ROBERT FARLEY: All you can do is control it.849
PATRICK REILLY: Well, that is what behavior modification is.85°
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That is behavior modification. It is not
844 See Deborah Churchman, Is Child Abuse a Disease?; Making a Case for
Treating Sex Offenders, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1988 at 8, (citing Dr. Martin Malin, of the
Johns Hopkins Sex Disorders Clinic, who avers that treatment teaches self-control, but
pedophiles will always sexually desire children).
845 Depo-Provera is an anti-androgen drug used to treat sex offenders who show
extremely high levels of testosterone. Id. Its effect is to lower the sex drive to a level
equivalent to a prepubescent stage. Id.
1
46 See Daniel Goleman, Therapies Offer Hope for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 1992, at C l (noting that studies have found that among many sexual offenders the sexual
urge is independent of their hormonal levels; thus drugs such as Depo-Provera, which act
which act upon testosterone levels, would have little effect in such cases).
847 See Lurigio, et al., supra note 800, at 72. "Treatment is designed to control (but
not cure) offenders' sexual aggressiveness and deviant behaviors." Id. "Offenders more
amenable to treatment accept responsibility for their crimes, regard sex offending as a
serious problem, and are motivated to stop their behaviors for the sake of future victims."
Id.
848 Behavior modification techniques, including "masturbatory satiation," reduce
psychological arousal by converting the focus of sensitization. Id. at 73. The goal is to
make offenders associate sexually deviant fantasies with aversive images in order to reduce
the stimulus otherwise associated with sexually deviant images, and, thereby, to reduce the
pedophile's arousal. Id.
49 But see generally id. (discussing the various sex offender treatments, including
cognitive-behavioral therapies, which do attempt to alter the offenders' attitudes and
thoughts).
850 Id.
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changing the way they think, and that is what I am concerned about.
Mr. Farley, how hard would it be to change the law to say pedophiles
now have their own law?
ROBERT FARLEY: As far as what is concerned?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As far as the sentences are concerned.
ROBERT FARLEY: We have submitted a bill to the legislature to do
it.
85'
AUDIENCE MEMBER: On this topic, has anything been introduced
regarding pedophiles being committed for life in New Jersey?
JANE GRALL: No, there has not.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is there a possibility there will be?
JANE GRALL: I do not think that is any more than a remote possibility.
PATRICK REILLY: Yes. Understand that the pedophile diagnosis
which is being used is a clinical diagnosis of a particular type of
person. 52 Not everyone that has taken advantage of a person under
eighteen necessarily fits the clinical diagnosis of pedophilia. " '
8' A. 10991,219th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996) (an act to amend the
penal law adding Section 4 to N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.08, which provides for life sentences
for sex offenders upon their second conviction).
852 See Montana, supra note 180, at 604 n.6. "'[Pledophilia is a state in which an
individual is pre-disposed to use children for his or her sexual gratification'..." (quoting
DAVID FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, 91 (1986). Id. See also
accompanying text.
153 See, e.g., Lisa Anderson, 'Megan's Law' Draws Support, Raises Questions,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE'., Aug. 21, 1994, at A36, available in 1994 WL 3587397
(discussing the case of a seyenteen-year-old boy who was convicted for the statutory rape
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: You advocate an alternative of life-long
imprisonment. Do you acknowledge that a problem exists with the
proportionality of that punishment to the crime, a problem which does
not exist with other crimes? 54 Should this cause us to pause and reflect
over whether this is just an emotional and timely issue that should not
spur life sentences? 5
ROBERT FARLEY: Well, we do not believe that is so. We think that
the severity of the crime justifies a life imprisonment term. There are
two things that you look at in punishment. That is why we believe that
the appropriate remedy is through the judicial system: going through a
court of law, where the defendant has prescribed rights under both the
federal and the state Constitution,856 where he can raise these other issues
to mitigate whether he should be convicted and given a life sentence.857
That is one issue. The other stems from the severity of a crime. When
you have a sexual predator go after a child and commit that heinous
crime, that act deserves life imprisonment. 8
of a sixteen-year-old girl and made subject to Louisiana's notification law).
." See generally, Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing:
The Supreme Court's TorturedApproach to Cruel and Unusual Punishmen 84 KY. L.J. 107
(1995-1996) (examining the Supreme Court's treatment of claims of excessive prison
sentences and recommending a standard of punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
.55 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 389, at 521-22. "Currently there is a national
outcry over [sexuai crimes against children]." Id. at 563 n. 12. "'Child molesters merit the
ultimate punishment and rehabilitation is a pathetic joke."' (quoting New Jersey resident,
Marion Sauter). Id.
856 See generally Louis D. B i I ionis, Criminal Law: Moral Appropriateness, Capital
Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. 283 (1991) (discussing the invocable
rights of defendants who are faced with life sentences).
8 57 id.
88 But see generally Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphilias and Depo-Provera: Some
Medical, Ethical and Legal Considerations, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH.& L. 233, 234
(1989) (analyzing pedophilia as a psychiatric disorder).
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JOHN J. GIBBONS: I do not think it is that simple. The Supreme Court
has held that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute somebody for
rape."' Rape is a pretty serious crime, too. I think that your proposed
legislation poses very serious Eighth Amendment problems.
60
ROBERT FARLEY: I do not believe that our society can justify not
providing life imprisonment sentences.8 6' When you talk about
execution, there certainly are constitutional issues which arise, but those
do not come into play with life imprisonment.162  Furthermore, the
convicted individual always retains the opportunity, as long as he or she
is alive, to overturn that sentence. 63
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I work with not only the offenders, but also
many, many victims. Most of the offenders, almost all of them, were
victims themselves. 64 They would rather have been dead than to live
"' See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that "a sentence of
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment").
860 See Grossman, supra note 854, at 193 (noting that although the Supreme Court
grants deference to state sentencing guidelines, Eighth Amendment analysis includes a
proportionalitytest which measures the severity of the crime against the sentence imposed).
But see Katherine P. Blakely, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders
is an Appropriate Legal Compromise Between "Mad" and "Bad" - - A Study of Minnesota's
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 227,
271 (1996) (stating that "any punishment short of death for any serious crime will likely not
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment").
61 See id. at 270 (advocating life sentences for sexual predators because they are
dangerous and likely to re-offend).
.62 See id at 271 (maintaining that only the death penalty is likely to raise Eighth
Amendment issues).
863 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §5501-25 (McKinney 1996) (explainingNew
York State's procedure for appeal, and, if successful, overturning of a conviction).
64 See Alice Park, Why Do They Do Those Horrible Things?, TIME, Sept. 2, 1996,
at 25 (stating that pedophilia may have its roots in childhood sexual trauma); see also
Freeman-Longo and Wall supra note 772, at 58-59 (claiming that over half of all sex
offenders progress from "victim to victimizer").
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through what they had to live through after their sexual traumas. So,
Judge, I am sorry, I do not agree with you. I think that the victims of sex
crimes have been given life sentences that you can never appeal.865
JOHN J. GIBBONS: Certainly the victims evoke a great deal of our
sympathy. But we are talking about the relationship between the State
and the person who is being incarcerated.866
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I wonder how Mr. Farley would respond to a
suggestion that his proposal criminalizes the status of being a pedophile,
instead of the behavior.867
ROBERT FARLEY: It does not criminalize the status of being a
pedophile.868 What it does do is provide for a life sentence for those who
conduct certain acts, such as raping a child.869 If you do that, and you
865 See Cheryl Wetzstein, Texas Child Molester's Case Reignites Decades-Old
Debate; 'First Responsibility... is to Protect Our Children,' WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996,
at A2 (opining that pedophiles should be given life sentences because the children they
molest must live with the ordeal of their sexual molestation for their entire lives).
866 See generally James W. Ellis, Limits on the State's Power to Confine
"Dangerous" Persons: Constitutional Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET
SOUNDL. REv. 635 (discussing a state's leeway and limitations in depriving individuals of
their physical liberty).
867 The Supreme Court has held that the criminalization of status is cruel and
unusual punishment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (striking down a
California statute which imposed criminal sanctions on individuals who are, inter alia,
addicted to illegal drugs).
868 But see Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST.
COMMENTARY257, 282 (1996)(arguing that sex offender registration statutes, by subjecting
a single class of persons to public disclosure, signal to the public that "members of this class
are so despicablethat reasonable people should do everything they can to avoid them," and
that "once a person has joined the class.., his status becomes permanent").
869 See, e.g., A. 10991, 219th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996) (an act to
amend the penal law adding Section 4 to N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.08, which provides for life
sentences for sex offenders upon their second conviction).
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are over a certain age," ° you will be sentenced accordingly. This is not
statutory rape.87' Every day we criminalize certain types of conduct.7
What we are aiming at here is the conduct, not the person. 73 That
person is sick, but we have to get rid of that type of conduct.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Your proposal is informed by the high rate of
recidivism in many cases. 4
ROBERT FARLEY: Absolutely.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Which indicates that it is not just the act of
punishing. It is the possibility that the act will be repeated.
ROBERT FARLEY: Absolutely. But when we deliver punishment in
our society, however it is delivered, for the crime of murder, for the
crime of rape, or for any other crime, there are two things that you look
at. The first is the severity of the crime and the actual punishment that
70 S. 6491,219th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996) (defining a pedophilic
offense as one committed by someone over the age of twenty-one).
s" In New York, a person over the age of twenty-one can be charged with third
degree rape if the individual has intercourse with someone to whom he or she is not married,
and who is less than seventeen-years old. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25(2) (McKinney 1996).
Second degree rape may be charged if the perpetrator is eighteen-years-old or more, and the
other person is less than fourteen-years-old. Id. at § 130.30. First degree rape is charged to
any male, regardless of his age, who engages in sexual intercourse with a person who is less
than eleven-years-old. Id. at § 130.35(3).
17 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(1) (McKinney 1996) (defining the term "offense"
as it appears throughout the New York Penal Law as "conduct" subject to state-imposed
punishment).
873 Id.
874 Jon R. Sorensen, Vacco Seeks Crackdown on Pedophiles Proposes Legislation
to Prohibit Bail, Create Life-Without-Parole Option, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 9, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 5494011 (quoting Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco of New York
who believes that pedophiles's recidivism justifies the imposition of life sentences).
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you are going to impose for that level of severity. 875 Second is the harm
to society and the need to keep that person away from society to reflect
upon the crime.876 Both of those considerationsare driving both of these
laws.
PATRICK REILLY: With regard to commitment, there is one more
question. We have now expanded the definition from
psychosis177-which was somewhat like an unwritten definition that
most of the psychiatrists used around the country-to include other types
of mental illnesses beyond psychosis.1 7' How broadly can we go? For
instance, in Russia years ago, they defined mental illness as disagreeing
with the governor, disagreeing with the government. 79 Can we simply
describe any behavior as illness, and then, if a person is deemed
dangerous, put him or her in a psychiatric hospital?
ERIC JANUS: Yes, I think we can..
... See generallyNIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 1 (1991) (discussing the reasons
for, and means of, societal institutionalization of punishment).
876 Id.
877 See DSM-IV, supra note 606, at 455-57 (distinguishing among the varieties of
psychosis);see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (6th ed. 1990) (defining psychosis as,
inter alia, "a severe mental disorder in which the patient departs from the normal pattern of
thinking, feeling and acting").
878 See, e.g., Claudine M. Leone, Comment, New JerseyAssembly Bill 155 -A Bill
Allowing the Civil Commitment of Violent Sex Offenders After the Completion of a Criminal
Sentence, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 890, 896-97 (1994) (stating that under the bill being
discussed, an individual need only be deemed dangerous, and need not be diagnosed as
psychotic, to be committed); Crimaldi, supra note 434, at 203 (referring to the Supreme
Court'svalidationofthe Minnesotacommitment statute in In re Blodget, 510 N.W.2d. 910,
the author states "[t]he Court seems willing to allow the states to define mental illness in
terms of compulsive behavior, rather than limiting the definition to psychosis").879 See generallyRyan Goodman, Note, The Incorporationof lnternationalHuman
Rights Standards into Sexual Orientation Asylum Claims: Cases of Involuntary "Medical"
Intervention, 105 YALE L. J. 255 (discussing, inter alia, various international and historical
definitions of psychiatric disorders).
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PATRICK REILLY: Constitutionally?
ERIC JANUS: Well, I think that, given the way these courts have been
looking at it to date, there has been absolutely no critical inquiry into
what it takes to be mentally ill. If the doctors said that repetitive bank
robbery was an illness, that would be an illness. That appears to be how
the principles go right now. Now, in actual fact, it may be that sex
occupies a special status in our society, and that so-called sexual
deviancy is more likely to be called illness than greed, for instance. But
the principles, at least in my judgment, would support a real broadening
of civil commitment.
8 0
PATRICK REILLY: And that would be constitutional?
ERIC JANUS: Although I think the courts are wrong, so far it appears
that it would be.
PATRICK REILLY: Alex, I am sure you have a response.
ALEXANDER BROOKS: I believe that the statute in Washington
employs the term "mental illness."88' It is based on diagnoses that are,
in effect, certified by the American Psychiatric Association, and I think
that that creates an extremely important limiting effect. 82 However, I
880 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities:
Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J. L. & HEALTH, 15, 38 (1993-1994) (noting, with
regard to civil commitment statutes in general, that "[a] pendulum swing has resulted in a
call for expanded commitment powers in many jurisdictions") (emphasis in original).
88' WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §71.09.020 (West Supp. 1995). Under this statute,
entitled Sexually Violent Predators, "'[m]ental abnormality' means a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a menace to the
health and safety of others." Id.
..2 But see In re Hendricks, 912 P. 2d 129, 135 (Kan. 1996). In its discussion of
Personal Restraints of Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993), the Kansas Court criticized the
Washington Supreme Court's "selective and inconsistent use" of the American Psychiatric
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can envision comparable mental conditions that have not yet been
incorporated into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (which the American Psychiatric Association publishes) as
possibly serving as a basis for mental illness. 83 What you are asking
about is the kind of slippery slope argument that is familiar to all law
students. If we are going to do this, are we next going to do that, and are
we next going to do the other? I reject that approach because I am
convinced that the courts will not permit us to go beyond a certain point.
If, however, they do permit it, they will have considered it very, very
profoundly and will have decided that it is an appropriate point to go to.
PATRICK REILLY: What sets the point? The Constitution? Common
law?
ALEXANDER BROOKS: Well, obviously, the Constitution is one of
the basic protections, so the Constitution will certainly be invoked if we
go too far.884 If we go beyond the boundaries of, as Professor Janus
refers to it, common sense. 5 I think the Constitution is the main
protection that we have against going too far.
PATRICK REILLY: I want to get back to community notification for
a while. Opponents of community notification argue that it would be
equated with an unacceptable degree of vigilantism.86 There have been
Association's definitions of mental illness, stating "mental illness means whatever the
Washington Court says it means." Id.
883 See, e.g., id.
..4 See, e.g., Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1993) (stating that "commitmentfor
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection ... [therefore.] a state must have a constitutionally adequate purpose for the
confinement").
885 Id.
886 See Feldman, supra note 238, at 2. "Opponents of the notification laws
regularly cite examples of vigilantism to support their claim that the law's impact is mostly
bad." Id.
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a number incidents of vigilantism in New Jersey. 87 Do you agree that
vigilantism and harassment are likely to occur? And are there ways in
which this consequence can be eliminated or significantly lessened?
What should we do about vigilantism if it is occurring, or to deter it from
happening?
JOHN J. GIBBONS: I think vigilantism is irrelevant to the problem,88
although it happens. Houses were burned down in the State of
Washington."' People were assaulted in the State of New Jersey.9 °
But the very purpose of the community notification statute is social
ostracism.
s9'
JANE GRALL: I was hoping that we would clear up the issue of social
ostracism and harassment today, whereas I think it has gotten muddier.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said that such results are
permissible, and are not violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 92 For
887 See, e.g., Gerry DeMarco, Innocent Man Beaten, Mistaken for Sex Offender,
THE RECORD (New Jersey), Jan. 11, 1995, at AI (reporting the first known vigilante attack
against a man who was mistaken for the registered offender the attackers sought).
888 But see id.; Sabin, supra note 425, at 351 (enumerating several incidents of
vigilantism and harassment directed toward actual or suspected sex offenders).
889 In 1993, a child molester's Lynwood, Washington house was burned after
authoritiesannounced his imminentjail release. Kim Murphy, 'Tip Sheets 'Try to Ferret Out
Fugitives; Local Tabloids Pick Up Where America's Most Wanted Left Off Featuring Crime
Suspects and Missing Children. Critics Fear Vigilantism, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 19,
1996, available in 1996 WL 5251875.
890 See DeMarco, supra note 887.
891 See, e.g., Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward Principled Distinction
In The Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1711, 1714 (1996).
"Community notification subjects ex-convicts to stigmatism and ostracism, and puts them
at the mercy of a public that is outraged by sex crimes." Id. But see Goodman, supra note
6, at 798 (noting that the purpose of Megan's Law is to protect society, not to subject sex
offenders to harassment or vigilantism).
.92 See Collins v. Youngblood,497 U.S. 37,41 (1990). "Although the Latin phrase
lex post facto' literally encompasses any law passed 'after the fact,' it has long been
recognized by this Court that the constitutionalprohibition on ex postfacto laws applies only
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instance, it is not punishmentto take away a person's medical license on
the basis of a conviction, 93 or to preclude a person, after a conviction,
from participating in a labor union as an officer;8 94 or to prohibit people
from possessing firearms on the basis of prior convictions. 95 Those
prohibitions, I believe, comprise legal ostracism, legal disability. The
community notification law does none of those things. It gives out
information about a person's criminal conviction, information that
anybody has access to. 96 Now, in New Jersey, we do give out additional
information. We give not only the fact of conviction, but also a
prediction of dangerousness. 97 That is where the additional protection
comes in; but that is not punishment. 98
Even assuming it were construed as punishment, I am still not
to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them." Id.
... See DeBlanco v. Ohio State Medical Board, 604 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (holding that the State Medical Board of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in ordering
permanent revocation of a doctor's medical license after she was convicted of a felony).
894 See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). The Court upheld a New York
law which prohibited collecting union dues from an officer or agent of the union who was
convicted of a felony because it was viewed as a state regulation and nota punishment. Id.
95 Any person who is convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than one year may not possess any fireairm or ammunition in a manner affecting commerce.
18 U.S.C.A. §922(g)( 1) (West 1996). What constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment
of more than one year is determined by the laws of the jurisdiction prosecuting the offense.
18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(20) (West 1996). Under a regulatory purpose analysis of these two
statutes, state laws which prohibit possession of firearms for a defined period following a
conviction do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d
1379 (9th Cir. 1995).
896 N.J. STAT. ANN. §47:IA-1 (West 1989) (providing that as a matter of public
policy "public records shall be readily accessible for examination by the citizens of this
State, with certain exceptions...").
1
97 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:7-8.b (West 1995) (listing relevant factors to be considered
in determiningthe "risk of re-offense," including conditions of release, the offender's age,
criminal history, psychological or psychiatric profiles and recent behavior).
... The New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld that state's sex-offenderregistration
law, stating that it is'not punitive, but rather it is a purely regulatory law aimed at protecting
the community from the evils of sexual crimes. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404 (N.J.
1995).
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sure that this would violate clear precedents regarding what a state is
permitted to do on the basis of a conviction, and regarding a law that
applies retroactively to that conviction. 99 If this is held to be
punishment, there are going to be quite a number of Supreme Court
cases which will subsequently be overturned."'
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I also want to touch on the issue of social
ostracism in terms of notification. Mr. Farley says that there is a ninety
percent recidivism for these people, so we are talking about a group of
people who are extremely dangerous to society. We require people to
register guns because we want to know who has them and how many
there are out there.9"' Here, we are talking about a dangerous group of
people, and we, as the public, have just as much a right to know about
that as we do about of those other dangers. So I do not think it
ostracizes anybody. I think it serves the useful purpose of notifying the
public. We have a right to know who it is we are living next door to, so
that we can guard against them.92 If it ostracizes in the process, that is
an unfortunate by-product, but the overall purpose is to give us that
useful information.
8" See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). "A law does not
become punitive simply because its impact, in part, may be punitive unless the only
explanation for that impact is a punitive purpose: an intent to punish." Id.
9 While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on any of the recently passed state
sex offender statutes (arguments were heard on December 10, 1996 for the civil commitment
portion of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-29(9)(02)
(1996)), habitual offender statutes, which allow increased punishment on the basis of prior
crimes, have been upheld and are unlikely to be affected. See Marcia Coyle, Swing Votes
Inject Suspense Into New Terms, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1996, at A 1. See, e.g., Parke v. Raley,
506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992) (upholding the use of prior convictions under a Kentucky habitual
offender statute).
9" See 46 U.S.C.A. §814 (West 1989) (providing for the creation of the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record).
902 New Jersey Congressman Dick Zimmer expressed this same sentiment when
he introduced the Federal version of Megan's Law (U.S.C.A. § 14017 (West Supp. 1996))
into the House of Representatives. See Adam Piore, House OK's Federal Version of
Megan's Law, THE REcORD (New Jersey), May 8, 1996, at A18.
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JOHN J. GIBBONS: Well, the logical conclusion of your position
would be that we impose that same sort of obligation on all of us. All
of us give genetic markers to the police. All of us report our intention
to move. All of us have private information about us readily available.
It would give the opportunity to avoid people you do not like, people of
certain nationalities, for example. Is that the kind of society you want
to live in? And if you are going to restrict it only to people who have
been convicted, then you must answer the question, does it inflict
punishment?93
AUDIENCE MEMBER: When it comes to balancing the interests of an
innocent school child walking home from school against the interests of
a convicted pedophile, who carries with him a ninety percent chance of
recidivism, it seems to be an obvious choice to me that the state has a
strong interest in protecting that school child,9"4 and a contrary
conclusion is difficult for me to accept.
JOHN J. GIBBONS: Well, your objection is to the Constitution because
when punishment is the issue, the Constitution does not permit balance
in favor of punishing a person twice for the same crime.95
903 The equating of notification laws with punishment has been significant in ex
postfacto and doublejeopardy arguments against the constitutionalityof Megan's Law. See,
e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d. 361 (N.J. 1995) (holding that Megan's Law passes
constitutional muster since any perceived punishment it imposes is merely a by-product of
its purely regulatory function).
9o' See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 412. "We find that the state interest in protecting
the public is legitimate and substantial .... We find, more importantly, that the interest in
disclosure substantially outweighs the interest in nondisclosure." Id.
905 "IN]or shall any person be subject for the same offence be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also Kenneth G. Schuler, Continuing Criminal
Enterprise, and the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2220, 2222 (1993).
"The notion that no person should be subject to criminal prosecution or punishment twice
for the same offense is perhaps the oldest and most widely recognized guarantee in the Bill
of Rights." Id.
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ROBERT FARLEY: But to say that it is punishment is to accept a
pejorative viewpoint that this is intended as social ostracism. I can tell
you that this statute was not intended as social ostracism.9 6 The
intention is to notify the public that these individuals have been released
and are out in the community.97 The effect may be
ostracism, but they are ostracized because of the crime they committed,
not because of the notification.98 All that notification does is provide
people with the knowledge that these individuals are being released. If
they were present in the courtroom when this person was sentenced, or
if they were there when he walked out of the prison door, they would
know that. But in this modem society, we are too big. We do not know
these things. This law provides us with an opportunity not to act like
ostriches and say if we do not know it, it will be okay. It provides us
with an opportunity to protect our children.
JANE GRALL: A tremendous amount of this information is readily
accessible to the public anyway, as was proven by the events in the two
cases where people brought the challenges to the law.90 9 The
newspapers had access to information about the individuals, the
906 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168 (McKinney 1996).
907 New York's version of Megan's Law has three levels of notification. N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 168-1. At the lowest level, only law enforcement agencies are notified
about an offender'srelease. Id. at §168-1(6)(a). The middle level authorizes those agencies
to release relevant information to the public, including the offender's approximate address
and photograph. Id. at §168-1(6)(b). The highest notification level allows discretionary
release of a wide array of information, including the offender's exact address. Id. at § 168-
1(6)(c). In addition, that information is collected in a directory which is publicly available.
Id.
90 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d. 367,405 (N.J. 1995). "The fact that some deterrent
punitive impact may result does not.., transform [Megan's Law] into 'punishment' if that
impact is an inevitable consequence of the regulatory provision." Id.
909 See Diaz v. Whitman, No. 94, slip op. (D. N.J. Jan. 3, 1995); Artway v.
Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D. N.J. 1995), affd in part and vacated in part,
81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
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convictions, the court records, and the transcripts of the trial.9"' The
press can and did get detailed information which was readily available
about Mr. Diaz9"t and Mr. Artway.9 12 Not from the state, but because it
is out there in the public realm. In Mr Artway's case, the information
could be garnered from the published opinions of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, 9 3 obviously readily accessible information. To call
dissemination of information punishment is ludicrous in this age where
information is so readily available.
JOH1N J. GIBBONS: If the information is out there, then the only
purpose for having Artway come in every ninety days and make his
ceremonial kowtow to the police. 4 is to remind him of what he has
done. Reminding him as specific deterrence, and deterrence is
punishment.915
90New Jersey law enforcement agencies may disclose any information about the
registrants under the Sexual Offender Registration Act so long as it is deemed "relevant and
•.. necessary for public protection." N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-5(a) (West 1995).
911 Significant press coverage accompanied Carlos Diaz's release from prison on
January 1, 1995. See, e.g., Michelle Ruess, Rapist Will Challenge Megan's Law; Seeks to
Block Public Notification, THE RECORD(New Jersey), Dec. 31, 1994, at Al; Robert Hanley,
Judge Curbs Law on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at A l; Christopher Kilbourne,
Backers Vow Fight to Save Megan's Law, THE REcORD (New Jersey), Jan. 5, 1995, at A3.
912 AlexanderArtway brought a civil rights action against the state of New Jersey
after he was convicted of sodomy in 1971 and made subject to New Jersey's Sexual Offender
Registration Act (N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7 (West 1995)) which was enacted two years after
his release from prison in 1992. Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D. N.J.
1995), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). For a discussion of
Mr. Artway's background and challenge, see generally Maureen Castellano, Judged
Acceptable, Barely, N.J.L.J.., Feb. 13, 1995, at 20.
913 Id.
914 In New Jersey, convicted sex offenders who are released from incarceration
must report their whereabouts to law enforcement agencies every ninety days. N.J. REv.
STAT. ANN. §2C:7-2(4)(e) (West 1995).
915 See Prevention Versus Punishment, supra note 891, at 1716 (stating that
deterrence is considered to serve one of the utilitarian purposes of punishment).
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RONALD K. CHEN: I would like to interject, first, with a few factual
observations. Recall that the information that is disseminated, at least
in New Jersey's version of the law, is not confined to the fact of
conviction.916 What is additionally reported is the individual's present
address, place of schooling, if relevant, place of work, and vehicle
license plate information.97 As a practical matter, if we are worried
about vigilantism and harassment, the release of this information is
going to be of much greater concern. If this were simply a question of
balancing, we are in a tug-of-war between the interests of the public and
the interests of sexoffenders. None of us are under any illusions as to
how that could come out. Yet, as Professor Gibbons said, there are
certain constitutional provisions that are simply absolutes. After all,
why are we asking this question about what is punishment? It is not
necessarily over, on balance, whose rights are of greater weight, but
whether a legislature can do a very particular thing: pass a retroactive
law. I disagree that calling something punishment is necessarily
pejorative. Governments impose punishment all the time, and usually,
in the appropriate circumstance. All of us say that is an absolutely
appropriate thing to do.9 ' You are avoiding the truth by saying because
punitive matters are considered to be negative, that you did not intend
punitive effects. Governments punish all the time validly. They just
cannot do it with two bites of the apple.919
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [What about the social ostracization imputed
to a family, when, for example, their child steals from a gas station]
now, are we going to change the laws and make his family's ostracism
916 See N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-4(b)(1) - (3) (West 1995).
917 id.
9" See, e.g., Judge Erwin Fleet, Commentary, Sentencingthe Criminal -A Judicial
Responsibility 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 339, 369 (1986). "Criminal laws represent society's
expressions, speaking through its elected representatives,as to that conduct which is socially
unacceptable and therefore prohibited on pain of punishment." Id.
9" "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend.V.
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part of his punishment?9 ° When somebody, some politician for
instance, does something and they are disgraced, suddenly social
ostracism becomes part of the punishment. I think you have to be across
the board on this.
JOHN J. GIBBONS: Yes, across the board. That is what the
Constitution says.92 If he is ostracized because he was convicted of
robbing a gas station, yes, that is punishment.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But that is not the point of punishment. 922
JOHN J. GIBBONS: But not twice.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Are you saying that a court is punishing a sex
offender by virtue of the fact that they will be socially ostracized.
PATRICK REILLY: I believe the Judge is saying that it is an additional
punishment.
JOHN J. GIBBONS: By virtue of being classified as posing a high risk
of re-offending. That classification is a punishment. 923
92°See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 1880, 1938 (1991) (noting the negative impact of shame and punishment on the
convicted person's family, called the "spillover effect," when the offense is widely publicized
or sensationalized).
921 "[Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or
limb .... U.S. CONST. amend.V.
922 But see Massaro, supra note 920, at 1886 (stating that the shaming sanctions
are "explicitly designed to make a public spectacle of the offender's conviction and
punishment, and to trigger a negative, downward change in the offender's self-concept" and
that "embarrassment is the principal purpose of punishment").
923 See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)(holdingthat a fine
of $130,000 for false medical claims totalling $535 was punitive despite remedial label of
statute).
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PATRICK REILLY: And the Constitution is clear that you cannot add
to the punishment."' The only question is whether this is punishment.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You cannot change society. The Court is
supposed to be above all of this bickering that we do.925
JOHN J. GIBBONS: But not above the Constitution.
PATRICK REILLY: That is right. The issue is, does this violate the
Constitution? If it does, whether you believe it is a morally appropriate
or inappropriate measure, we have to live with it being unconstitutional.
DANIEL FELDMAN: I think that is an appropriate way to frame the
issue, but our viewpoint is very clear, at least with regard to New York's
statute. In New York, our viewpoint is that his is not punishment-it is
[T]he -determination of whether a given civil sanction constitutes
punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of
the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said
to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes
punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves
the goals of punishment. Id.
924 See U.S. CONST., amend. 5.
925 Justice John Marshall stated, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803). However, in 1840 the political philosopherAlexis de Tocqueville observed that
the Supreme Court did far more than merely interpretthe law, noting that the Justices "must
be statesmen, wise to discern the signs of the times, not afraid to brave the obstacles that can
be subdued, nor slow to turn 'away from the current when it threatens to sweep them off..
• ." 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 152 (Phillips Bradley et al., eds.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1946) (1840).
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simply notification. It is dissemination of information.926 The people
who say that individuals affected by this law are ostracized as a result of
being classified are the very same people who were arguing that the
reason the original New Jersey statute was not constitutional was
because it did not classify them.
Your comments were right on point. First, essentially, the
material that our Megan's Law in New York makes available is
information that is, in principle and in theory, already accessible.
Accessible, that is, to anyone who puts a tremendous amount of time and
effort into digging the material out.91 7  So from a threshold
constitutional, legal, and philosophical point of view, the law passes
muster.92 The law does not actually add to the public's right to get
information because it could get that information now; therefore any
ostracism that ensues is a result of the conviction for the initial crime.
Those criminal records are a matter of public record.929
926 Bill Alden, Rochester Judge Rejects Challenge to 'Megan's Law,' N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 20, 1996, at I (noting that a Rochester judge rejected arguments that the statute
imposes an additional punishment). But see Brian Jenkins, ACLU Questions
ConstitutionalityofMegan's Law, CNN News, May 17, 1996 (quoting Loren Siegal of the
ACLU as saying that "notification is punishment... if they've already served their time in
prison, the notification is a second punishment").
927 But see United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763, 764 (1989) (holding that a compilation of information from
government documents that are readily available to the public nonetheless tips the balance
against disclosure when the privacy interest of an individual citizen is at stake).
928 Id.
929 But see Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 668 (D. N.J. 1995).
The registration and public notification provisions of Megan's Law
provide public dissemination ... of a convicted sex offender's name,
likeness, place of residence, place of employment, a description and
identification of his motor vehicle, as well as that information already
available in the public record. Therefore Megan's Law goes well
beyond all previous provisions for public access to an individual's
criminal history. Id.
For a discussion of the recent cases concerning sex offender registration laws, see Claire M.
Kimball, Note & Comment, A Modern Day Arthur Dimmesdale: Public Notification When
Sex Offenders Are ReleasedInto the Community, 12 GA. ST. L. REV. 1187, 1214-15 (1996).
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However, there is the following footnote. There is the Supreme
Court holding in Reporters Committee,93° which, although it does not
address the New York law, it does address what some people feel is an
analogous issue, that by making a practical change so that information
is more readily accessible you are, in fact, changing the constitutional
balance. 3 ' Now, I believe that opinion may be confined to its facts, and
that it is not relevant here. Nevertheless, one could argue that simply
because we have taken information which is already theoretically
accessible and rendered it practically accessible, we have changed the
constitutional balance.932
Now, take all that and put it in the context of state-imposed
punishment. A state obviously has a right to impose punishment at its
first bite of the apple. The constitutionalquestion which arises with this
kind of law is based on the ex post facto prohibition, but that is not a
simple issue.9 33 You understand that virtually no state legislature is
going to enact a notification statute and state that it is only to be applied
to people who are convicted after it is enacted. The public would say,
what, are you crazy? How about all those convicted sex offenders who
are out there now, aren't you going to protect us against them? So
virtually every notification statute is retrospective in that it applies to
people who were convicted already. Thus, the question arises: is this
ex post facto punishment?.3 .
Now, here is the way the constitutional analysis of that question
takes place. Generally, it is not enough for a legislature to say it did not
930 United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
931 Id, at 763-64.
932 Id.
933 See, e.g., State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wash. 1994) (rejecting a
contention that notification constitutes punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause).
934 See Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D. N.J. 1995)
(holding that the notification aspects of Megan's Law violated the constitutional prohibition
against expostfacto laws), affd in part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that the challenge to the notification aspects of Megan's Law were not ripe).
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intend it to be punishment, that it intended it to be something to
safeguard the public. 935 The effect, as well as the intent, have to be
predominantlywhat they call regulatory, which means safeguarding, not
punishing.936 How do you judge that? Do you judge it by the fact that
there is some harassment, some vigilante behavior? Incidentally, at one
point in this discussion, I meant to credit Professor Brooks. Professor
Brooks has written, I think quite accurately, that while one can predict
that there will be some vigilante activity, one can also reduce it,
minimize it, mitigate it, through some legislative approaches.93 v In any
case, we have attempted to do that in the New York statute.938
Let me return to the main thrust of this discussion. Does the fact
that some negative things happen mean that the law punishes people in
a constitutionally violative way simply because they occur after those
9" In 1963, the Supreme Court established what are now referred to as the
"Kennedy" factors which are to be considered when determining if a statute is penal or
regulatory in character. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
These factors include:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on finding scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whetheran alternativepurpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable to it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id.
936 Id.
... See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 409 (N.J. 1995). There will be "'strong
emphasis on providing.. . advice concerning consequences of vigilante activity" and that
"law enforcementwill investigate all allegations of criminal conduct by any person against
the offender . . . and will criminally prosecute where appropriate' (quoting ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, GUIDELINE VI, METHODS OF COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION). Id.
93 See, e.g., People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (stating that
"the legislative debate centered on safety risks to children if community notification was not
enacted, and concerns of vigilantism by opponents of the legislation").
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individuals have already been convicted and, presumably punished?...
Our answer is no because the constitutional analysis asks whether the
burden you place on offenders is greater than that which is necessary to
provide societal protection.94 ° For example, if you are notifying
everyone under the sun, whether they are in any danger whatsoever, or
whether there is any conceivable danger, you may be engaging in more
notification than necessary to achieve even the optimum safety result.
But if the notification provision is limited within reason to apply only so
far as is necessary to achieve the optimal safety result,94 then any
incidental burden on the offender is not punishment.942 The courts do
not require perfection.943 There are also other cases where the courts
have held that if it is an additional burden on the offender, but that
burden is merely incidental to a legitimate public interest, in this case,
a public safety interest, that is not a violation of the ex post facto
939 See, Goodman, supra note 6, at 798 (stating that "opponents of Megan's Law
claim that registration and notification constitute punishment because the law deprives a
small group of offenders of their anonymity and could potentially subject them to ostracism,
harassment, or vigilantism").
940 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 372 (N.J. 1995) (stating that the community
notification provisions of Megan's Law are constitutionally valid as long as they are
reasonably designed to protect society and not designed to punish).
... See State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1994) (holding that limited
"disclosure of registration informationto the public does not impose additional punishment
on registrants").
942 See Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404-05 (holding that the registration and notification
requirements of Megan's Law do not constitute further punishment, because they are
carefully tailored to perform a regulatory purpose, and are, therefore, not excessive even if
"some deterrent punitive impact may result"). See also Ward, 869 P.2d at 1070 (holding
that the potential burdens placed upon sex offenders by the statute "fit the threat posed to
public safety" and "arise from the offender's future dangerousness, not as punishment for
past crimes").
"I Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 372 (maintaining that the community notification
provisions, given their "remedial purpose, rationality, and limited scope . . . are not
constitutionally vulnerable because of [their] relative impact on offenders").
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prohibition against punishment. 944
RONALD K. CHEN: I agree with just about everything Mr. Feldman
just said. Particularly, I was very heartened to hear that he agrees-and
this has been my major concept point too-that the inquiry into what
constitutes punishment must involve an inquiry into effect, not merely
intent.945
JANE GRALL: I want to correct that, too. We all agree to that
proposition, and the New Jersey Supreme Court does not come even
close to saying intent is all that is necessary.946
RONALD K. CHEN: I think we all agree with that proposition.
Discerning the effective meaning of Chief Justice Wilentz's opinion is
something that could keep the law professors or lawyers in this room
occupied for many years. 947 I would agree that the Supreme Court
... See State v. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1072, 1074 (concluding that appropriate and
necessary notificationof the public does not constitute punishment for purposes of an expost
facto analysis). But see Artway v. Attorney General., 876 F. Supp. 666 (D. N.J. 1995)
(finding that the Tier Two and Tier Three levels of public notification constitute a form of
punishment, and, therefore violate the Ex Post Facto Clause), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 81 F.3d 1235, 1234 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding the constitutional challenge unripe, and
describing the tier system as a risk-determination scale with corresponding levels of
community notification).
'5 The first step in determining whether a statute is punitive or regulatory for ex
post facto purposes involves a review of the legislature's intent in enacting the measure.
Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691,699 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). If such intent is clearly punitive, no
further inquiry is necessary. Id. The mere fact that the intent is regulatory, however, does
not end the inquiry. Id. Thus the court must undertake a historical and functional analysis
to determine if the statute's effect is punitive. Id. at 699-700.
946 But see Michael Booth, U.S. Rift Leaves Megan's Law Fate Unclear, N.J.L.J.,
July 31, 1995, at I (reporting that New Jersey Deputy Public Defender Matthew Astore
opined that Judge Wilentz relied heavily on legislative intent and really did not consider the
effect of the law when reaching his decision in Poritz (662 A.2d 367)).
947 See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 422 (1995) (stating that the judges "sail
on truly uncharted waters," and -acknowledging the "unavoidable uncertainty of [their]
decision").
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opinions as to what constitutes punishment, and the methodology for
determining that, are capable of several interpretations?4 The language
in Austin949 and Halpe 5° suggests that if a provision cannot solely to be
said to serve a legal purpose, but can be said to serve, at least in part, a
retributive or a deterrent goal, or words to that effect, then it is
punishment."'
With regard to all of the comments that suggest that notification
is a method of protectingthe public or just allowing the public to know,
I can say yes, that is exactly what it is. But it also, at least in part, has
served the goal of retributionr? 2 or deterrence.953 As I read Austin... and
... See generally Christine M. Kong, The Neighbors are Watching: Targeting
Sexual Predators with Community Notification Laws, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1257 (1995)
(comparing several opposing holdings from different courts analyzing notification statutes
under the tests set forth by the Supreme Court); Goodman, supra note 6, at 787-88 (stating
that the Court in Doe v. Poritz (662 A.2d 367 (1995)) rejected the challenger's interpretation
of a line of Supreme Court cases concerning the methodology for determining what
constitutes punishment, and interpreted the cases very narrowly to come to a different
conclusion).
9" Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding that statutory civil
forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.A. §§881(a)(4) and (a)(7) (West 1995) (which provides for the
forfeiture of vehicles and real property used to facilitate the commission of certain drug
related crimes) constitutes "a monetary punishmentand, as such, is subject to the limitations
of the Excessive Fines Clause" of the Eighth Amendment). The defendant in this case pled
guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of South
Dakota law, and the United States filed an in rem action in federal court against his mobile
home and auto body shop under 21 U.S.C.A. §§881(a)(4) and (a)(7). Id.
950 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that a statutory penalty
imposed by the civil False Claims Act (U.S.C.A. §§ 3729 - 3731) violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause because a defendant who had already been criminally prosecuted (in this
case for filing false Medicare claims) may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction
that cannot be fairly characterized as remedial, but only as deterrent or retributive).
9" See id. at 448; Austin, 509 U.S. at 603.
952 See, e.g., Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Alaska 1994) (noting
that the "consequences [of the Alaska notification law] may have a deterrent effect on
offenders and may visit retribution on registrants").
953 See Artway v. Attorney Gen. N.J., 876 F.Supp. 666, 690 (D.N.J. 1995), affd
in part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). "Megan's Law, in application,
would deputize every member of registrant's community and thus achieve the ultimate
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Halper95 that is all that is necessary to show that it is punishment,956
therefore, you cannot exact it after the fact. Now the long-term question
of whether community notification imposes an undue, unbalanced
imposition upon the privacy rights of the individual is a completely
different question, and actually that really has not been litigated yet.
957
JOHN J. GIBBONS: A substantive due process challenge on privacy
grounds was asserted 958 but has never been determined by any court, at
least in New Jersey. 959
PATRICK REILLY: Does anyone want to comment on what would be
needed to prove that, under substantive due process, the law is
constitutional? [Professor Gibbons] raised the issue of substantive due
process, and that it has not been litigated. Does anyone have an opinion
on it?
JOHN J. GIBBONS: One observation which has been made today
strikes me as somewhat misleading. It has been said that it is only
public information that is being made the subject of the notifications.
That is not true. The notification includes the notification of the
classification into which an individual is placed. 96° These people are
deterrent against re-offense by the registrant. This stated objective, regardless of how
innocuously it has been couched by the legislature, clearly constitutes a traditional element
of punishment: deterrence." Id.
... Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
9" United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
956 See id. at 448.
957 But see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (upholding New Jersey's
registration and notification laws against a right to privacy challenge, the Court found that
the state's interest in protecting communities substantiallyoutweighed the offender's limited
privacy interests under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions).
958 Id.
959 Id.
960 N.J STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8(C) (West 1995).
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being classified by the state as medium risk or high risk offenders in a
very slipshod proceeding in which they have the burden of proof.961 You
cannot ignore the fact that that very classification is stigmatizing. It
affects a privacy and a liberty interest.962
JANE GRALL: I do not want to ignore that we do additionally disclose
such classifications in New Jersey.9 63  The disclosure of those
classificationscannot be considered punishment for the past act because
classification depends on a prediction made at the present time which is
unrelated to the past act.964 And now, with the New Jersey Supreme
Court's modificationto provide a due process hearing,161 it becomes even
more attenuated from the initial crime and a claim that it can be
punishment for that act. It is a judicial proceeding to determine the risk
of offense relative to other offenders at the time of notification, not at
961 If an individual has been classified as a low, medium or high risk sex offender
in New Jersey, he may object to such classification and request ajudicial hearing at which
he has the burden of persuasion. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d. 367, 383 (N.J. 1995).
962 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 420. "[l]f classified in Tier Two or Three,
plaintiff's name and standing in the community would be threatened to the extent that his
prior undisclosed criminal history and his new classification became known. We conclude
that the consequencesto the plaintiff's reputation from classification ... implicate a liberty
interest." Id.
963 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2D:7-8(c)(3) (West 1995) (stating that the statute authorizes
the New Jersey Attorney General to promulgate guidelines for community notification).
964 But see Risk Assessment supra note 396. This form is utilized to arrive at a
numerical assessment of an offender's risk to the community, taking into consideration
criteria which fall under the categories of seriousness of the offense, offense history,
characteristics of offender, and community support. Id. Offense history includes the sub-
categories victim selection, number of offenses/victims, duration of offensive behavior,
length of time since last offense, and history of anti-social acts. Id.
965 Doe. v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 382 (N.J. 1995) (requiring that sex offenders be
afforded an opportunityto object to their risk-level classifications during judicial hearings
designed to protect "private interests in privacy and reputation" and to ensure that
"deprivationsof those interests occur only when justified by the risk posed by the offender").
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the time of the offense or conviction.966
PATRICK REILLY: Most of the criteria and the guidelines are taken
from a period when the person actually committed the crime, are they
not?
JANE GRALL: Several of the criteria are based on the commission of
the most recent crime and the prior crimes that the person may have
committed, but there are also many factors that are determined on the
basis of the response to treatment and recent behavior.967
PATRICK REILLY: Is it possible to get a Tier Three classification just
on the basis of the crime?
JANE GRALL: No, I do not believe so.
PATRICK REILLY: If you scored at the highest levels of the Sex
Offender Risk Assessment Scale for the categories of degree of force,
966 The Poritz Court outlined New Jersey's three-tier classification process. Id. at
383-84. To determine the appropriateness of Tier One notification, "the characteristics of
prior offenses or of the offender are relevant only to the risk of re-offense, i.e., the likelihood
of its occurrence." Id. at 383. To determine if Tier Two notification is appropriate:
the State's prima facie case shall include a description of the class
of sex offenders required to register who constitute low-risk
offenders, including a description of that risk, which need not
necessarily be statistical ... some proof in the form of an expert
opinion or otherwise that the moderate-risk offender class poses a
risk of re-offense substantially higher than the low risk class, and
that the offender before the court is a moderate-risk offender who
poses such a substantially higher risk. Id.
For Tier Three notification, the State's case must include the low-risk and
moderate-riskrequiremenis as well as those same requirements as they are applied to high-
risk offenders. Id. at 383-84.
... Id. at 404 (stating that "the notification is not based solely on prior conduct, but
on the offender's record after conviction, after release, the record up to the very date of Tier
classification and notification, including responsiveness to treatment ....").
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degree of contact, age of victim, victim selection, number of offenses
and victims, duration of offensive behavior and history of anti-social
behavior, and you had a drug history, would you remain a high risk
forever?
96
JANE GRALL: I do not think that is correct. I think it is possible to get
a Tier Two [assessment] on the basis of the crime alone.969
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I believe that the New York State law provides
for out-of-state offenders to have to register in New York ten days after
they come into the state.97° Is that a fairly common provision in all the
states? If not, is there an inter-state compact or agreement that might
address a common provision?
JANE GRALL: It is also a requirement in New Jersey.7 The federal
law, which only requires registration, not community notification, serves
968 See Risk Assessmen4 supra note 396. The base rates for each of the thirteen risk
factors included within the scale's four general categories are modified by the multipliers
assigned to low, moderate and high risk behaviors. Id. For instance, the category entitled
'Seriousness of Offense' includes an assessment of the degree of contact, which has a base
rate of five points. Id. That sub-category is ranked as follows: a low risk multiple of zero
is based on no contact or fondling over clothing; a moderate risk multiplier of one is based
on fondling under clothing; and a high risk multiplier of three is based on penetration. Id.
An offender's final score determines his or her risk level: zero to thirty-six points is
considered low risk (Tier One), thirty-seven to seventy-three is considered moderate risk
(Tier Two) and seventy-four to Ill is considered high risk (Tier Three). Id.
969 A first time offender, who responds well to treatment and has a good degree of
community support would only be placed in Tier Two, no matter how serious the offense
was. Id.
970 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168-k (McKinney 1996). The New York statute also
provides for notification of appropriate law enforcement agencies of an offender's move
from New York to other states. Id. at § 168-f(4).
971 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-2(3) (West 1996) (noting that "[a] person moving to
or returning to this State from another jurisdiction shall register with the chief law
enforcement officer of the municipality in which the person will reside... within ... 70
days of first residing in or returning to a municipality in this State ......
170
MEGAN'S LAW
as that inter-state compact.972
RONALD K. CHEN: I would assume that is a common provision in all
these state notification statutes.
973
JOHN J. GIBBONS: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Having worked with sex offenders in Rhode
Island, I discovered that many of them, if not most of them, search very
carefully for the victim. They do not take the kind of victim that might
have a very close parent relationship, or a parent who is likely to look
out for and be concerned about there being a sex offender in the
neighborhood. The offenders search out those very lonely children who
have hardly any parental relationship or have a gap in that relationship.
It is as though they have another sense, a sensation of who is a
vulnerable child, and they will search out that child.
JANE GRALL: That has not been our experience in New Jersey at all.
Take, for example, the four instances I mentioned earlier. Megan was
lured from her backyard while the family was around. 974 Another child
was lifted over a fence in the backyard she was playing in, while her
972 42 U.S.C.A. §1407 (West Supp. 1996) (establishing guidelines for state
registration programs). The Federal statute imposes a duty upon local law enforcement
agencies to inform those in other states of a sex offender's move to their jurisdiction. Id. at
§ 1407(b)(1)(A)(1II).
... See Bedarf, supra note 190, at 889 (referringto similarities among the nation's
sex offender registration laws, the author states that "sex offenders generally must register
with the chief of police in the area in which they intend to live").
... Megan Kanka, after whom Megan's Law was named, had walked across the
street from her home to play with her dog when Jesse Timmendequas allegedly abducted her
to his neighboringhome, where he allegedly raped and killed her. See Mike Kelly, A Town's
Innocence Lost: Memories Strong One YearAfter Megan Kanka 'sDeath, THE RECORD (New
Jersey), July 27, 1995, at Al.
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mother and her aunt were inside of the house.975 Another child was
playing on the street with her siblings, when somebody offered her a
quarter to run around the comer to see how fast she could do it. The last
that anybody saw of her was when she turned the corner. 76 Each one of
the instances fall outside of your scenario. I am sure there are instances
like that, but those were not the cases that we were exposed to.
PATRICK REILLY: There are a number of criticisms of Megan's Law
on social grounds. Perhaps we can hit them.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In the past ten years, there has been no report
of recidivism of anyone in the Rhode Island treatment program I work
for.977 There is careful supervision of every offender after treatment.
They agree not to accept employment or do not live in a place that
would endanger the program. They have to commit to those
requirements when they enter the treatment program, and they also
commit to continuous supervision afterwards.97
PATRICK REILLY: One of the arguments against Megan's Law is that
it effectively drives the sexual offenders out from the suburbs into the
9 David Cooper was convicted for the murder of six-year-old Latasha Goodman
whom he raped and strangled after luring her from her aunt's yard with an offer of ice cream.
See Sue Epstein, Death Sentence Given in Rape, Strangling of Girl, STAR LEDGER
(Newark), May 18, 1995.
976 Conrad Jeffrey, a mentally ill parolee, raped and suffocated seven-year-old
Divina Genao who was lured by his offer of a quarter. See Elaine D'Aurizio, Cop Beheld
Divina's Birth, Death, THE RECORD (New Jersey), June 23, 1996, at Al.
"' The speaker is referring to the Adult Correctional Institute (ACI) in Rhode
Island, where approximately one hundred men participate in the Sex Offenders Treatment
Program run by Peter Loss. See Felice J. Freyer, Innocence Lost, Child Sexual Abuse in
Rhode Island: Prison Program Aims to Break Cycle of Sex Abuse, PROVIDENCE SUNDAY
J., Aug. 25, 1996, at Al.
... For a full description of the Rhode Island program, see id.
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inner cities, where notification has no meaning.979
ROBERT FARLEY: When you are dealing with a suburban community
where the police force is at a higher percentage per individual, it is
easier to ensure public safety and to keep track of somebody than it is in
an urban area.98 ° However, this statute does not discriminate against
different areas. Additionally, one can discover, pursuant to our
community notification statute, where the person is regardless of
whether it is in a city, a suburban area or an affluent area. Certainly
there are more crimes and it is easier to hide in the cities.98' Yet I do not
think that is going to drive people to the cities. They are going to remain
where they are, but now they are going to be registered as well.
PATRICK REILLY: Did that not occur in New Jersey under New
Jersey laws 9"2
JANE GRALL: I do not see any evidence of that happening. In New
Jersey, the scope of notification, or how broad the notification can be,
is something that the offender can challenge. 983 There is a different
scope of notification applicable depending on what is appropriate under
979 See, e.g., Montana, supra note 180, at 582-83 (noting that "sex offenders find
large cities and inner city areas attractive because law enforcement agencies in these areas
usually lack the time and resources to enforce community notification laws. As a result,
[those areas] have become havens for migrating sex offenders").
... See, e.g., id. at 584 ("Middle-and upper-middleclass neighborhoods, which do




982 See id at 580 n.48 (citing Carlos Diaz as an example of a man who left New
Jersey in order to avoid application of the sex offender notification law against him).
93 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 378 (N.J. 1995) (requiring that sex offenders
be afforded a hearing to object to their risk-level classifications). For a discussion of
defendants' rights with regard to sex offender notification laws, see generally Goodman,
supra note 6.
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the circumstances? 4 That scope is determined at the judicial hearing.985
Prosecutors are bringing maps to those hearings which indicate exactly
which areas they are planning to notify. I do not think there is any
reason to believe that is going to be less effective in the cities.
RONALD K. CHEN: I will make what I think is a neutral statement.
At this point, and for some time to come, I do not know if we are going
to have anything more than anecdotal evidence to support or contradict
the proposition that these laws are going to force registrants in search of
anonymity into urban and poor areas. I already related the two
anecdotes about both Judge Gibbons' client and mine, who both left the
state because of the pressures put upon them and their families.9"6 I do
not offer that as evidence, nor even presumptive evidence, of what
would happen in the long term. My concern is that there will never be
anything more than anecdotal evidence. Of course, there exist better
experts than I on this matter. And it is difficultto obtain valid empirical
evidence, given the fact that the people involved are attempting to not
be found.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Or they commit their crimes someplace else
... See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 378-80 (N.J. 1995) (explainingthat the Attorney
General has, pursuant to the powers granted by the notification statute, adopted guidelines
which provide a fluctuating system of notification based on the assessed risk of future
offense).
985 The Attorney General must notify the offender on an imminent Tier
classification so that he or she may be afforded an object to the classification during an in
camera hearing. Id. at 367. The offenderbears the burden of persuasion at that hearing. Id.
986 Professor Chen represented Carlos Diaz, and Judge Gibbons represented
Alexander Artway, both of whom challenged the constitutionality of New Jersey's sex
offender registration and notification law. See Diaz v. Whitman, No. 94, slip op. at 9 (D.
N.J. Jan. 3, 1995); Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D. N.J. 1995), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d. 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
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where they do not live, or on the internet. 987 At Avenel, for instance,
half of the inmates have computers, and they can hardly wait to get on
line to commit crimes.988 They do not necessarily offend where they
live.9 9
JOHN J. GIBBONS: I am principally concerned with whether the law
is constitutional. This issue simply has nothing to do with that.
Nevertheless, I will make a prediction. It is going to have the same fate
in ten years as the drug user registration statute in New Jersey had.99 °
Notification will become a nuisance to law enforcement and they will
stop doing anything about it. Eventually, it will be repealed.
98 The federal government has recognized the possibility that sex crimes may
occur via the internet, but attempts to restrict online speech which is deemed indecent have
been the subject of controversy. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824 (E.D.P.A. 1996)
(striking down a statute which censored materials appearing on the internet).
988 Contra, Telephone Interview with Grace Rogers, Assistant Superintendent of
the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center at Avenel, N.J. (Oct. 24, 1996). According to
Rogers, as of September 30, 1996, inmates only have access to classroom computers. Id.
Although some inmates did have computers in their cells before a ban was imposed during
September, 1996, they were not equipped with modems which would provide internet
access. Id.
989 See Montana, supra note 180, at 593. Megan's Law does not require law
enforcement officials to notify surrounding communities, presuming that convicted sex
offenders will only re-offend within the notified community. Id. Released sex offenders,
however, who experience a compulsion to offend, will find a victim regardless of whether
the victim resides in a notified or un-notified community. Id.
990 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 169A- 1 -169A- 10, rep'd by L. 1971, c. 231, § 1, eff. June
23, 1971. See also Doe v. Poritz, 661 A.2d 1335, 1342 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995):
The statute.. .requiredpersons previously convicted
ofnarcoticsviolationsto register with the police in
the municipality of their residence. Registrants
were required to carry a card evidencing the fact
that they were in compliance with the law, and had
to show this card to the police chief in any
municipality they visited with the intention to stay
more than twenty-four hours. Id.
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DANIEL FELDMAN: When we were attempting to enact this law in
New York, one frequent criticism was that it was just politically
motivated, and it would create all kinds of damage without doing any
good whatsoever.99' We were, to a certain extent, relying on our own
common sense in arguing otherwise. Since then, however, the
Washington State study that appeared this autumn99 2 has demonstrated
two points that we had predicted, but have now been shown in reality.
First, community notification enables members of the community to
help the police overcome hindrances caused by their record-keeping
problems. Therefore, released sex offenders who re-offend are
apprehended more quickly than they had been in the absence of such a
statute.993 Second, they are apprehended for less serious offenses than
would otherwise be the case.994 So that what we had predicted has
turned out, essentially, to be true. That is, while the released offender
may commit one more sex offense, the released offender is less likely to
commit six or seven more offenses before being apprehendedthe second
99 See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Bill to Track Sex Offenders Nears Passage, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1995, at B1 (noting that lobbyists asserted that "[w]ith the Assembly Democrats
feeling vulnerable on crime issues, particularly after [Governor] Pataki's victory last
November, Mr. [Sheldon] Silver [Assembly Speaker and Manhattan Democrat] clearly faced
intense political pressure not to oppose the bill").
992 Donna D. Schram & Cheryl D. Milloy, Community Notification: A Study of
Offender Characteristicsand Recidivisn4 WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, Oct. 1995, at 16
(comparing recidivism rates among Washington sex offenders who were and were not
subject to community notification).
... See Bedarf, supra note 190, at 909 (stating that police "lack the manpower to
track offenders" and that community notification enables the community to provide
additional labor to aid law enforcement); Feldman, supra note 238, at 2 (stating that
communitiesaid police by identifyinga suspect more quickly, and preventing "the offender
from completing what would otherwise have been a series of attacks" (citing Schram &
Milloy, supra note 992, at 16)). But see id. at 16 (noting that those who were subject to
community notification re-offended more quickly than those who were not).
9"4 See Feldman, supra note 238, at 2 (noting the reduction in degrees of crimes
for which Washington sex offenders are re-arrested (citing Schram & Milloy, supra note
992, at 16)).
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time. 95 Secondly, in situations involving loitering in a schoolyard, for
instance, the offenders may even be apprehended before completing a
rape or an attack, and both of those things have been borne out by the
Washington State study.996 I, therefore, would argue that it is fairly clear
at this point that the statute does, in fact, do some good. Is it a panacea?
Of course not, but it does increase safety to some extent.
PATRICK REILLY: The Washington State study found no reduction in
the recidivism rate, correct?
DANIEL FELDMAN: Yes, that is the piece of it that people love to
cite. 997 What they do not tend to cite are the findings concerning the
nature of that recidivism.
PATRICK REILLY: That is correct. Does anyone want to make a final
statement?
ROBERT FARLEY: I just want to thank everybody for participating
today. It has been a wonderful discussion. I know that I have enjoyed
it greatly. The Attorney General has worked with Dan Feldman. 99 We
are working with Senator Skelos,999 and we are quite confident that the
New York statute is going to pass constitutional muster. Quite a bit of
thought went into it and we were able, with the history and the ground-
995 See id.
996 Id.
... See, e.g., Ball, supra note 206, at 440 n.247 (stating that the Washington Study
did not demonstrate a reduction in the number of "repeat sex offenses" and that sex
offenders "re-offended at a similar rate" regardless of whether they were subject to the
notification law (citing Schram & Milloy, supra note 992, at 16)).
998 See Billy House, Pataki Signs Sex-Offender-Registry Bill, GANNETr NEWS
SERV., July, 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2902182 (noting that Attorney General Dennis
Vacco, Senator Dean Skelos, and Assemblyman Daniel Feldman sponsored New York's
version of Megan's Law).
999 Id.
19971
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
breaking of New Jersey, to follow that state's lead and make
amendments to it. I think it is a statute which well deserves a long
degree of history and praise. °°
'"Id. (stating that, according to Dennis Vacco, although New York's community
notification law follows that of New Jersey, New York officials made "significant changes"
to avoid the legal problems associated with the New Jersey law).
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